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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Matthew Elliott Cohagan appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. Cohagan contends
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
While on patrol early one afternoon, Officer Marvin Curtis saw a man
walking who he thought he recognized as M. Morgan, an individual who had
outstanding warrants. (5/6/2014 Tr., p.10, L.16 - p.12, L.20.) Officer Curtis and
another officer, Officer Otto, were in their patrol car at the time and were "trying
to get in front of [the individual] to make contact with him." (5/6/2014 Tr., p.12,
Ls.11-12, p.22, Ls.8-11.) As they "drove past and tried to get in front of him, he
crossed back to the southwest corner" of the street, and by the time the officers
turned around and went "through the lights, he had gone into the Albertsons
store located there." (5/6/2014 Tr., p.12, Ls.15-20.) The officers went inside the
store where Officer Otto made contact with the individual who identified himself,
with a driver's license, as Cohagan. (5/6/2014 Tr., p.13, Ls.3-7, p.25, Ls.1-19.)
Officer Curtis was not with Officer Otto when that happened. (5/6/2014 Tr., p.13,
Ls.3-7.)
Shortly after Officers Curtis and Otto left Albertsons, they returned at the
request of another officer who needed assistance in "obtain[ing] some video from
a completely separate incident." (5/6/2014 Tr., p.13, Ls.8-13.) As Officer Otto
"went to get the video," Officer Curtis "decided to go see if [he] could see who the
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individual was because [he] hadn't seen him the first time" and, because Officer
Otto was new to the department, Officer Curtis wanted to make sure the
individual he thought was Morgan did not provide Officer Otto with fake
identification. (5/6/2014 Tr., p.13, Ls.14-17, p.26, L.8 - p.28, L.1.) As Officer
Curtis got within 10 to 15 feet of Cohagan, he realized Cohagan was not Morgan,
"but at that point [Officer Curtis] still wanted to ask his name and ID him."
(5/6/2014 Tr., p.28, Ls.2-12.) As he approached Cohagan, Officer Curtis asked,
"What's your name," and Cohagan responded, "Matthew Cohagan. How are you
today officer?"

(Exhibit 1, 00:00-00:05.)

Cohagan then volunteered that he

came back because he "forgot his sodas, and some formula for the kid," and a
"cop" said, "hey, can I get your ID, and I'm all, what did I do?" (Exhibit 1, 00:0500:11.)

In response, Officer Curtis asked, "Can I see your ID, too?" and

Cohagan said, "absolutely man," and gave Officer Curtis his driver's license.
(Exhibit 1, 00:011-00:23.)
As Officer Curtis examined Cohagan's driver's license, he explained:
"You just kind of resemble another guy we're looking for," and asked, "you have
any warrants or anything?" (Exhibit 1, 00:26-00:31.) Cohagan answered, "no,
no, I'm good," and continued to explain how he saw the officers, remembered he
forgot his groceries, and was "like, ok." (Exhibit 1, 00:31-00:42.) Cohagan then
asked, "are we good?" (Exhibit 1, 00:40-00:41.) Officer Curtis said, "yeah man, I
just want to check and make sure you don't have any warrants."
00:42-00:43.)

(Exhibit 1,

As Officer Curtis made contact with dispatch, Cohagan was

checking his phone and asked, "Can I grab my formula?"; Officer Curtis
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answered, "sure," and Curtis walked away.

(Exhibit 1, 00:44-01 :09.)

Officer

Curtis followed a few feet behind Cohagan and, after hearing from dispatch that
Cohagan might have a warrant, he said: "Hey, come here, they're telling me you
might have a warrant. I don't want you running around the store here." (Exhibit
1, 01 :09-01 :22.)

Cohagan turned around briefly but continued to walk away.

(Exhibit 1, 01 :22-01 :26.) Officer Curtis told Cohagan to walk up to the front of
the store, and he continued to follow Cohagan.

(Exhibit 1, 01 :26-01 :37.) As

Officer Curtis escorted Cohagan to the front of the store, they encountered
Officer Otto in one of the aisles and, on more than one occasion, Officer Curtis
instructed Cohagan to "relax" and keep his hands out of his pockets. (Exhibit 1,
01 :26-2:07; 5/6/2014 Tr., p.16, L.4 - p.17, L.2.)

At two minutes and seven

seconds into the encounter, Officer Curtis asked dispatch where the warrants
were out of and he confirmed the warrants approximately 40 seconds later, and
advised Cohagan of that fact.

(Exhibit 1, 02:07-02:53.) The officers arrested

Cohagan over his resistance. (Exhibit 1, 02:53-03:14; 5/6/2014 Tr., p.18, L.22 p.19, L.22.)

During a search incident to arrest, the officers found a bag

"containing a white crystalline substance" and a "glass smoking device with white
crystal substance." (See R., p.39.)
The state charged Cohagan with possession of methamphetamine, and
filed an Information Part II alleging Cohagan is a persistent violator. (R., pp.1314, 24-27.)

Cohagan filed a motion to suppress, claiming he was unlawfully

seized when Officer Curtis "approached him inside the Albertson's store and
demanded his identification."

(R., pp.38-39.)

3

Cohagan further requested

suppression of his statements and the evidence found during the search, arguing
the evidence and statements were "obtained unlawfully and unconstitutionally."
(R., p.39.)

After a hearing on Cohagan's motion, the district court entered a

written decision denying Cohagan's request for suppression.

(See generally

5/6/2014 Tr.; R., pp.62-67.)
After the court denied his suppression motion, Cohagan entered a
conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to challenge the denial of his motion,
and the state agreed to dismiss the sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.105-114.)
After Cohagan failed to appear for sentencing, and prior to his second
sentencing hearing, which was set after Cohagan was arrested for failing to
appear, the court advised Cohagan it was not bound by the plea agreement
given Cohagan's failure to appear.

(R., pp.118-121, 125-126, 131-132.) The

court, however, permitted the parties to submit briefing on whether Cohagan was
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.

(R., p.132.)

Cohagan thereafter filed a

motion to withdraw his guilty plea and a supporting brief. (R., pp.133-134, 139150.) Cohagan later withdrew his motion after the court and the parties agreed
that the court would follow the original agreement with a modification allowing the
court to retain jurisdiction without any recommendation as to placement.

(R.,

pp.152-160.) Consistent with the plea agreement, the court imposed a unified
seven-year sentence with three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction.
pp.168-170.) Cohagan filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.171-173.)
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(R.,

ISSUE
Cohagan states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Cohagan's motion to
suppress because the evidence seized was the direct result of the
illegal detention?
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Because the initial encounter was consensual, and the subsequent
detention was justified by reasonable articulable suspicion and then probable
cause that Cohagan was wanted on a warrant, has Cohagan failed to establish
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress? Alternatively, even if
this Court concludes there was an improper detention at some point during the
brief encounter, did the district court correctly apply the attenuation doctrine and
the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454
(2004), in denying Cohagan's request for suppression given the discovery of an
outstanding arrest warrant?
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ARGUMENT
Cohagan Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Cohagan asserts the district court erred in denying his suppression

motion.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-16.)

Specifically, Cohagan argues that the

evidence seized when he was arrested should have been suppressed, claiming it
was "the direct result of the illegal detention because Officer Curtis detained
[him] so that he could run a warrant check." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Application
of the law to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing shows
Cohagan's argument fails.

Officer Curtis' initial contact with Cohagan was

consensual and his subsequent detention of Cohagan was based first upon
reasonable suspicion that Cohagan had an outstanding arrest warrant followed
by probable cause when that warrant was confirmed. Even if the detention was
unjustified at some brief moment, the district court correctly concluded that
suppression was not required under the attenuation doctrine because the
discovery of the warrant was an intervening circumstance sufficient to purge any
taint.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers

to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards
have been satisfied in light of the facts.

State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482,

485-486, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d
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306, 309 (2004).

However, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,

resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in
the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P .2d 993, 997
(1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).
The appellate court also gives deference to any implicit findings of the trial court
supported by substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984
P.2d 703, 706 (1999).

C.

Cohagan Has Failed To Show Any Error In The Denial Of His
Suppression Motion
When addressing a claim, like Cohagan's, that the district court erred in

denying a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate court must first "decide
whether the initial encounter was lawful." State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843,
103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004).

If the seizure was not lawful, the Court then

"analyze[s] whether the discovery of a valid warrant for [Cohagan's] arrest
dissipated any possible taint of unlawful police conduct."

kl

In this case, the

prosecutor "admitt[ed] holding the ID was probably a seizure," and the district
court found that Officer Curtis's "contact with [Cohagan] in the grocery store
transformed from a consensual contact to an unlawful detention." (5/6/2014 Tr.,
p.38, Ls.18-19; R., p.66.) Although not entirely clear, it appears the district court
found the "unlawful detention" occurred when Officer Curtis "seiz[ed]" Cohagan's
license. (See R., p.66 ("there was a minimal lapse of time between the seizure
of the license and the discovery a [sic] valid arrest warrant").) This Court is not,
however, "limited by the prosecutor's argument or the absence thereof," State v.
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Veneroso, 138 Idaho 925, 930, 71 P.3d 1072, 1077 (Ct. App. 2003) (citation
omitted); and this Court freely reviews the trial court's determination as to
whether constitutional standards have been satisfied in light of the facts,
Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 485-486, 211 P.3d at 94-95.
"An encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen does not
trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it is nonconsensual." Willoughby, 147
Idaho at 486, 211 P.3d at 95 (citations omitted).

To constitute a seizure, the

officer must, "by means of physical force or show of authority," in some way
restrain an individual's liberty.

!st

This "requires words or actions, or both, by a

law enforcement officer that would convey to a reasonable person that the officer
was ordering him or her to restrict his or her movement."

!st (citations

omitted).

"[A] request for identification or mere questioning is not enough, by itself[,] to
constitute a seizure."

State v. Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 990, 88 P.3d 1226,

1230 (2004) (citations omitted).

'This is so because the person approached

need not answer any question put to him and may decline to listen to the
questions at all and go about his business." State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520,
523-524, 826 P.2d 481, 484-485 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 497-498 (1983)). The relevant inquiry is whether, under the totality of
the circumstances, "a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the law
enforcement officer"; if so, "then the encounter is consensual."

!st

As the district court acknowledged, the encounter between Cohagan and
Officer Curtis was initially consensual. (See R., p.66.) To the extent the district
court found (or the state conceded) that the encounter became non-consensual
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the moment Cohagan handed Officer Curtis his license, such a conclusion is
incorrect and unsupported by the evidence.

Officer Curtis did not demand

Cohagan's license, nor otherwise compel him to provide it. Rather, Officer Curtis
asked Cohagan, "Can I see your ID, too?" and Cohagan said, "absolutely man,"
and gave Officer Curtis his driver's license.

(Exhibit 1, 00:011-00:23.)

Cohagan's voluntary act of giving Officer Curtis his driver's license did not
convert the consensual encounter into a seizure. United States v. Drayton, 536
U.S. 194, 201 (2002) ("Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for
suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification,
and

request consent to search

luggage-provided they do not induce

cooperation by coercive means."); Page, 140 Idaho at 844, 103 P.3d at 457
(quotations, citation, and brackets omitted) ("Interrogating a person concerning
his identification or requesting identification does not, without more, constitute a
seizure."). That Officer Curtis continued to hold Cohagan's license while he ran
a warrants check, after telling Cohagan that he was going to do so, would only
be sufficient to transform the contact into a seizure if a reasonable person would
not feel free to "terminate the encounter."

kl

Given that Cohagan felt free to

ask Officer Curtis if he could go "grab [his] formula" while Officer Curtis checked
for warrants, and, in fact walked away to do so, supports a finding that a
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reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter. 1 (Exhibit 1, 00:4401 :09.) Cohagan could have just easily asked for his license back; that he did
not do so does not mean he was seized. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,
216 (1984) ("While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that
people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly
eliminates the consensual nature of the response.").
The first point at which Officer Curtis attempted 2 to seize Cohagan was as
Cohagan was walking away to get formula and Officer Curtis told him to "come
here" because dispatch just advised him that Cohagan might have a warrant.
(Exhibit 1, 01 :09-01 :22 (Officer Curtis says: "Hey, come here, they're telling me
you might have a warrant. I don't want you running around the store here.").)
That attempted seizure was not unlawful because the information received from
dispatch that Cohagan might have a warrant provided reasonable articulable
suspicion to detain Cohagan for a reasonable amount of time to confirm or dispel

1

The state recognizes that the Court in Page noted its prior decisions holding
that "a limited detention does occur when an officer retains a driver's license or
other paperwork of value." Page, 140 Idaho at 844, 103 P.3d at 457 (citations
omitted). In Page, however, the officer retained Page's identification and
returned to his patrol car to run a warrants check, id. at 843, 103 P.3d at 456,
and the Court held Page was improperly detained once his license was retained,
id. at 845, 103 P.3d at 458. Unlike Page, Officer Curtis did not take Cohagan's
license and return to his patrol car. Rather, he held Cohagan's license while
Cohagan stood there and then walked behind Cohagan while holding his license
after Cohagan went to allegedly get some formula. The state submits that, on
these facts, any retention of Cohagan's license was insufficient to convert the
consensual encounter into a detention.
2

See State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 593, 903 P.2d 752, 758 (Ct. App. 1995)
(an individual is not seized until he submits to law enforcement's show of
authority).
10

that information. State v. Law, 115 Idaho 769, 771, 769 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Ct.
App. 1989) (information that individual was "an unlicensed driver wanted on a
bench warrant" provided an "articulable and objectively reasonable suspicion to
stop" the automobile the defendant was driving). That confirmation occurred in
less than two minutes, at which point Officer Curtis could unquestionably arrest
Cohagan on the outstanding warrant and search him incident to arrest. Page,
140 Idaho at 847, 103 P.3d at 460 (once an officer "effectuate[s] a lawful arrest,
he [is] clearly justified in conducting a search incident to that arrest"). This Court
may, therefore, affirm the denial of Cohagan's motion to suppress on the basis
that Officer Curtis never unlawfully detained Cohagan. State v. Dycus, 154 Idaho
456, 459, 299 P.3d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho
96, 102, 685 P.2d 837, 843 (Ct. App. 1984)) ("Where a ruling in a criminal case
is correct, though based upon an incorrect reason, it still may be sustained upon
the proper legal theory.")
Even if this Court concludes a seizure occurred sometime during the one
minute that elapsed between Cohagan voluntarily giving Officer Curtis his
driver's license and Officer Curtis acquiring reasonable articulable suspicion to
detain Cohagan, the district court correctly concluded suppression was not
warranted under the attenuation doctrine. "To determine whether to suppress
evidence as 'fruit of the poisonous tree,' the court must inquire whether the
evidence has been recovered as a result of the exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."
Page, 140 Idaho at 846, 103 P.3d at 459 (citation omitted). A court considers
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three factors "when determining whether unlawful conduct has been adequately
attenuated": "(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition
of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the
flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action."

kl

The district court cited the three-factor test for attenuation and, relying on
the opinion in Page, the court first found "there was a minimal lapse of time
between the seizure of the license and the discovery [of] a valid arrest warrant."
(R. p.66.) "As to the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement
action," the court found "Officer Curtis testified extensively that the individual
resembled another suspect who he knew had an outstanding arrest warrant."
(R., p.66.)

The district court then concluded that while it found "the officers'

conduct in the grocery store unnecessary and that an unlawful detention
occurred, the discovery of an outstanding warrant was clearly an intervening
factor between the unlawful seizure and discovery of the evidence which forms
the basis of the new charges against the defendant." (R., pp.66-67.)
Cohagan contends the district court erred in its analysis, arguing that
although the discovery of his outstanding warrant was an intervening event, "the
other two factors-lapse of time and flagrancy and purpose of the improper law
enforcement action-tip the balance against attenuation."
p.8.)

(Appellant's Brief,

With respect to the lapse of time, Cohagan asserts the district court

incorrectly "believed that the relevant time period was the length of the unlawful
detention" rather than the "time between the misconduct and acquisition of the
evidence." (Appellant's Brief, p.9 (italics omitted).) Cohagan also complains the
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state "failed to present any evidence on" what he believes is the "relevant time
period-from when the [sic] Officer Curtis confirmed the warrants to when the
officers discovered the evidence." (Appellant's Brief, p.10 (italics omitted).) Both
of these arguments fail for the same reason misunderstanding of the law.

they are based on a

Indeed, two of the cases Cohagan cites for his

belief that the "relevant time period" is the time between the "misconduct and the
acquisition of the evidence" do not support his claim.
In State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466, 468, 197 P.3d 327, 329 (Ct. App.
2008) (cited in Appellant's Brief, p.9), officers responded to a residence to
investigate a report that the defendant was holding his wife against her will.
When the officers arrived, they "saw Reynolds standing just outside of the front
door, which was ajar."

kl

Two officers approached Reynolds to question him

about the report they received while a third officer "entered the home through the
partially-opened door" without first knocking or calling out to Reynolds' wife, and
even though the officer did not "hear any noises coming from the house."

kl at

468-469, 197 P.3d at 329-330. "Upon entering," the officer saw Reynolds' wife
"standing in the living room about ten feet from the door."

kl at 469,

197 P.3d at

330. Reynolds' wife was "visibly upset" and said "Reynolds had pushed her onto
the couch and also restrained her when she was trying to leave the bedroom."

kl

The officer questioned Reynolds' wife about the odor of marijuana he noticed

shortly after entering the house, and Reynolds' wife "said that there was
marijuana in another room."

Id.

Reynolds' wife gave the officer consent to

search the home and told the officer that a locked "large plywood box" located in
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the home belonged to Reynolds.

lit

Reynolds' wife also directed the officer to

Reynolds' key ring and told him to "try the key."

lit

The key opened the plywood

box which contained "marijuana plants and grow lamps."

lit

"At some point-

whether before or after opening the box is unclear-[the officer] also observed in
another room marijuana hanging-from the ceiling to dry."

kl

"Reynolds argue[d] that the evidence discovered during the search of his
home must be suppressed because the police illegally entered the house without
a warrant or other justification in violation of the Fourth Amendment." Reynolds,
146 Idaho at 469, 197 P.3d at 330. The Court rejected the state's assertion that
exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into Reynolds' home. lg_,_ at
470-471, 197 P.3d at 331-332.

The Court, however, held that the search of

Reynolds' home was valid pursuant to Reynolds' wife's consent.

lit at 472-475,

197 P.3d at 335-336. The Court framed the "attenuation question" as "whether
[Reynolds' wife's] consent was 'fruit of the poisonous tree,' i.e., a product of the
unlawful entry."

kl

at 474, 197 P.3d at 335. Addressing the first factor of the

three-factor attenuation test, the Court considered the relevant time period to be
"between the police misconduct and [Reynolds' wife's] consent."

lg_,_

The

"relevant time period" was not, as Cohagan claims, between the "misconduct and
the acquisition of the [marijuana]" (Appellant's Brief, p.9) - it was between the
misconduct and the circumstance that rendered the officer's search lawful, i.e.,
Reynolds' wife's consent.
In United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 517 (th Cir. 1997) (cited in
Appellant's Brief, p.9), officers followed a car based on a belief that one of its
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occupants was a fugitive or that one of the occupants might know the
whereabouts of the fugitive. The officers stopped behind the car after the car
pulled into a driveway and the driver was already walking toward the house.

1st

One of the officers "exited the police car and, while approaching the driver, yelled
that he needed to speak with him for a second."
provided identification.

1st

1st

Upon request, the driver

"In the meantime," the second officer made contact

with the passenger, who was still in the car, and requested his identification.

1st

"The officers returned to the squad car and entered the information in their
computer to determine the validity of the drivers' licenses, as well as to check for
outstanding warrants."

Id.

"Within five minutes the computer revealed an

outstanding warrant for [the passenger]," and the officers arrested him.

kl

The

officers searched the car and discovered crack cocaine and a gun, after which
the driver was also arrested.

1st

Green argued he was entitled to suppression of the evidence, claiming the
detention was unlawful once the officers recognized neither of the car's
occupants were the fugitive they were looking for, and that the continued
detention to run a warrants check violated the Fourth Amendment. Green, 111
F.3d at 518. Although the Seventh Circuit found the "stop in the first instance
was illegal" because it was unsupported by reasonable articulable suspicion, it
held the lawful arrest of the passenger on an outstanding warrant "constituted an
intervening circumstance sufficient to dissipate any taint caused by the illegal
automobile stop."

kl

at 519, 521.

In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh

Circuit cited the Supreme Court's three-factor attenuation test but correctly noted
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that: "In the final analysis, however, the question is still whether the evidence
came from 'the exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint"' 19.:_ at 521 (citing Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), and quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488 (1963)). "Typically, the intervening circumstance which dissipates the
taint involves a voluntary act by the defendant, such as the voluntary confession
or consent to search given after an illegal search or seizure." Green, 111 F.3d at
522. Stated another way, the taint is dissipated once there is a voluntary act by
the defendant regardless of the timing of the actual discovery of evidence or, in
the case of an outstanding warrant, the taint is dissipated once the warrant is
discovered. See
- id.
As illustrated in Green and Reynolds, while the time factor of the
attenuation test has been phrased in terms of the lapse "between the misconduct
and the acquisition of the evidence," Page, supra, in application, this factor
considers the time between the misconduct and the point at which there was a
lawful basis for the police action.

In this case, the "relevant time period" was

between whatever point, if any, the Court decides a seizure unsupported by
reasonable suspicion or probable cause occurred, and the moment when
reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed.

The district court properly

analyzed the time factor in this manner, and the state was not required to put on
any additional evidence beyond the point of a lawful detention. Cohagan's claim
to the contrary fails.
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Cohagan also appears to claim that the time factor weighs against
attenuation in this case.

(See Appellant's Brief, p.10 ("Presumably then, the

officers discovered the evidence relatively quickly, which would cut against the
State.").) Cohagan is incorrect. It is true that in cases involving consent as the
intervening circumstance, a short time between the illegal seizure and the
consent often weighs against attenuation, but this is because "the closer the time
period, the more likely the consent was influenced by the illegality, or that the
illegality was exploited." Green, 111 F.3d at 522. The same is not, however,
true where the intervening circumstance is the discovery of an outstanding
warrant.

lsL. As explained in Green, "where a lawful arrest due to an outstanding

warrant is the intervening circumstance, consent (or any act for that matter) by
the defendant is not required."

lsL. Thus, "[a]ny influence the unlawful stop would

have on the defendant's conduct is irrelevant."

lsL. "Thus," where the intervening

circumstance is arrest on an outstanding warrant, "there is less 'taint' than" in
cases involving consent or confessions.

lsL. If anything, the short length of time

between any illegal detention and the discovery of a warrant weighs in favor of
attenuation in this case.

Compare Page, 140 Idaho at 846, 103 P.3d at 459

("there was a minimal lapse in time between the seizure of the license and the
search pursuant to a valid arrest warrant").
Cohagan next contends that "the district court based its conclusion that
the officers' actions were not sufficiently flagrant on an erroneous factual
finding."

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) The allegedly "erroneous factual finding" is

based on the district court's belief that "the officers' conduct in the grocery store
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[was] unnecessary" and its statement that "Officer Curtis testified extensively that
[Cohagan] resembled another suspect who he knew had an outstanding
warrant." (Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-11 (quoting R, p.66).) Cohagan complains
that the district court's statement about Officer Curtis' testimony "overlooked that
Officer Curtis already knew that Mr. Cohagan was not the person they were
looking for when Officer Curtis asked Mr. Cohagan for his license," and therefore
"Officer Curtis's initial belief that Mr. Cohagan was [Milo Morgan] is irrelevant to
the analysis."

(Appellant's Brief, p.11 (brackets original).)

There is a vast

difference between an erroneous factual finding and a contention that certain
evidence is irrelevant.

Officer Curtis did testify about his belief that Cohagan

was Morgan, and he advised Cohagan of that fact when he made contact with
him in the grocery store. (5/6/2014 Tr., p.10, L.16 - p.12, L.20; Exhibit 1, 00:2600:31.) That Cohagan believes the entire purpose for making contact with him
was "irrelevant," does not render the district court's factual finding about the
purpose erroneous.
Moreover, Cohagan is incorrect in his assertion that it "increase[d] the
flagrancy of Officer Curtis's conduct" for him to ask Cohagan if he could see his
"ID" despite realizing, as he got closer to Cohagan, that Cohagan was not
Morgan.

(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) There is nothing flagrant about requesting

identification during a consensual encounter regardless of whether an officer
knows the individual's identity.

As for Cohagan's assertion that this action

"increase[d] the flagrancy," this claim appears to be based on the district court's
belief that the officers conduct was improper because it "created an unnecessary

18

risk to the defendant, to law enforcement officers, and to the community" for the
officers to "enter the store and detain the defendant" because it could have
"created an unnecessarily tense situation that could have elevated to a much
bigger conflict." (R., p.65.) It is this portion of the district court's analysis that is
irrelevant.

It is not "misconduct," flagrant or otherwise, for law enforcement to

enter a store to make contact with an individual inside a store, whether the
contact is consensual or based on reasonable articulable suspicion or probable
cause. Neither the district court nor Cohagan have cited any authority that would
support such a proposition. Nor is it flagrant misconduct for an officer to request
someone's identification and run a warrants check after the individual voluntarily
complies with that request. Compare Page, 140 Idaho at 846-847, 103 P.3d at
459-460.

Indeed, much of Cohagan's argument on the flagrancy factor is

improperly based on actions taken by Officer Curtis at points when there was no
unlawful detention, such as the initial consensual contact when Officer Curtis
asked Cohagan if he could see his identification, and Officer Curtis's attempt to
detain Cohagan once he had reasonable articulable suspicion that Cohagan was
wanted on a warrant. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) Cohagan's claim that Officer
Curtis engaged in any flagrant misconduct, much less conduct "so shocking as to
tilt the scales against attenuation," fails.

Page, 140 Idaho at 846, 103 P.3d at

459 (quotations and citations omitted).
Finally, Cohagan argues that, although the Page decision "sets forth the
rule this Court should apply," the "analysis and holding" in Page "do not control"
for two reasons. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) First, Cohagan claims the analysis in
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Page is "flawed because it considered the wrong period of time for the first
factor." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Second, Cohagan contends the facts of his
case are distinguishable from Page.

(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)

Both of these

arguments lack merit.
Cohagan's complaint that the Court in Page applied the "wrong time
period" in its analysis is presumably based on the same faulty arguments he
made in relation to the district court's discussion of this factor in this case. For
the reasons already stated, this argument fails as a matter of law.
Cohagan's attempt to distinguish Page also fails. 3

This contention is

based on Cohagan's arguments that Officer Curtis' conduct was "flagrant,"
whereas the officer's conduct in Page was not because that officer "acted out of
concern for Page's well-being."

(Appellant's Brief, p.14.)

For the reasons

already stated, Cohagan's claim that Officer Curtis engaged in flagrant
misconduct is without merit.
The district court correctly relied on Page in denying Cohagan's motion to
suppress. "Here, there was a minimal lapse of time between the seizure of the
license and the search pursuant to a valid arrest warrant." Page, 140 Idaho at
846, 103 P.3d at 459. Officer Curtis' "conduct was certainly not flagrant, nor was
his purpose improper."

kl

"Clearly, once [Officer Curtis] discovered that there

was an outstanding arrest warrant, an intervening event under Green, he did not

3

As noted in footnote 1, supra, the state does submit that Page is
distinguishable with respect to the issue of whether the "retention" of Cohagan's
license amounted to an unlawful detention.
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have to release [Cohagan] and was justified in arresting him at that point."4
846-847, 103 P.3d at 459-460.

kL. at

"Once he had effectuated a lawful arrest, he

was clearly justified in conducting a search incident to that arrest" and "it was not
unlawful for the officer to seize the drugs discovered incident to that arrest." Id.
at 847, 103 P.3d at 460.
The district court correctly denied Cohagan's motion to suppress;
Cohagan has failed to show otherwise.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon Cohagan's conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine.
DATED this 15th day of December, 2015.
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Deputy Attorney General

On October 1, 2015, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, on the following question: "Should evidence seized
incident to a lawful arrest on an outstanding warrant be suppressed because the
warrant was discovered during an investigatory stop later found to be unlawful?"
4
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